The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Bilateral Relations Revisited? by Nasra, Skander
 
 
 
 
The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: 
Bilateral Relations Revisited? 
 
 
Skander Nasra 
Skander.Nasra@UGent.be  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D R A F T.  W O R K  I N  P R O G R E S S. 
Please do not quote without author’s permission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUSA Eleventh Biennial International Conference,  
Panel Session 4G ‘Europeanization of National Foreign Policies’, 
Los Angeles, California,  
April 23-25, 2009.- 1 - 
 
A B S T R A C T 
 
The Europeanization of foreign policy is widely considered to be beneficial to smaller 
EU member states. Yet, the conditions under which they may pursue their foreign policy 
objectives as well as the consequences of EU membership to their bilateral policies with third 
countries remains scarcely researched. This paper first examines the possibilities for smaller 
member states to influence the development of EU foreign policy. The paper then goes on to 
analyze the way a smaller member state’s role in EU foreign policy may impact on their 
national foreign policies to third countries. This paper thus links the analysis of the  EUs 
foreign policy system to studies of Europeanization. Concretely, this paper analyzes the role 
of Belgium – as one of the EU’s smaller member states – in the development of EU foreign 
policy towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The paper concludes that four factors 
determine the extent of a smaller member state’s influence in EU foreign policy: the extent to 
which the policy process is characterized by the ‘logic of arguing’, the role of information, the 
extent of involvement of a member state and the presence of EU actors. This role influences 
whether  EU  membership  ends  in  a  strengthening  of  a  smaller  member  state’s  bilateral 
relations – resulting in a pattern of parallel diplomacies – or its convergence into a wider 
European whole.  
 
 
Introduction
12 
 
In the past decades, the European Union’s (EU’s) activities in the field of foreign and 
security policy have undergone substantial changes. From a modest attempt to coordinate 
member states’ foreign policies, the European Union evolved into an international actor which 
is widely acknowledged to have the potential to be a major force in shaping global events. 
Within the context of its expanding external activities, the EU is seen as one of the world’s 
economic  superpowers,  as  an  emerging  player  in  international  diplomacy  and,  although 
tentatively, in security affairs. 
Despite this evolution, EU member states reserve the right to act unilaterally in the 
sphere of foreign and security policy, and they often do so. This raises questions regarding the 
relation  between  member  states’  foreign  policies  and  the  extending  and  deepening 
                                                           
1 Some of the information presented in this paper  was obtained  via personal interviews  with both national 
representatives and EU officials in Brussels in April 2007 and from February to April 2009. Because of requests 
for anonymity, these will only be indicated by a general reference. 
2 This paper presents the preliminary results of a broader research project of which the aim is twofold. In this 
project the role of smaller EU member states in the formation of EU foreign policy will be examined. Second, 
the project aims at analyzing the impact of EU membership on smaller EU member state’s bilateral relations 
with  third  countries.  To  this  end,  the  role  of  three  smaller  member  states  (Belgium,  The  Netherlands  and 
Sweden) will be analyzed in bilateral as well as multilateral contexts. The underlying assumption is that the role 
that a smaller member state plays in the formation of EU foreign policy determines the consequences of EU 
membership on their bilateral relations. The aim of this paper is thus rather modest, presenting and discussing 
partial results of the first case study. 
 - 2 - 
 
international  role  of  the  EU.  The  literature  on  Europeanization  examines  the  extent  of 
influence, opportunities and constraints on member states’ foreign policy choices due to EU 
membership (Smith 2000, Tonra 2001). Europeanization entails ‘a process of policy change 
manifested as policy convergence as well as national policies amplified as EU policy’ (Wong 
2005: 150). It is widely argued that the EU’s external activities are primarily an instrument for 
member states to pursue national objectives (Regelsberger et. al. 1997: 4, Zielonka 1998: 62). 
The  dominant  EU  member  states  –  meaning  those  countries  that  dispose  of  an  extensive 
diplomatic network – are said to perceive the EU primarily as a means to strengthen national 
foreign policy-making (Hill 1993, Risse-Kappen 1996). Member states with a less extensive 
diplomatic  network  will  ‘rather  wish  to  enmesh  themselves  in  a  European  rather  than  a 
national  system  of  foreign  policy-making’  (Manners  and  Whitman  2000:  262-263).  The 
influence  of  EU  membership  on  member  states’  foreign  policies  is  thus  assumed  to  vary 
depending on the size of member states. 
This line of argumentation underestimates – if not neglects – the potential of smaller 
states to direct the development of the EU’s external policies. This paper wishes to examine 
this potential, looking at the opportunities for smaller member states to reinforce their national 
system of foreign policy-making rather than to ‘enmesh’ into a European system of foreign 
policy-making. Subsequently, this paper will analyze the way and extent to which the process 
of Europeanization affects a smaller member state bilateral diplomacy. Linking the analysis of 
the EU’s foreign policy system to studies of Europeanization, this paper thus addresses the 
following research questions: first, to what extent can a smaller member state influence EU 
foreign policy? Second, how does the process of Europeanization affect a smaller member 
state’s bilateral relations with third countries? In this paper, a small member state will be 
defined  as  a  non-dominant  member  state  in  EU  foreign  policy,  lacking  an  extensive 
diplomatic network comparable to those of dominant states such as France and the United 
Kingdom (Manners and Whitman 2000). In addition, these states have a limited resource base 
which is characterized by factors such as population size, geographical size, economic weight, 
diplomatic resources and military capabilities (Kelstrup 1993: 140). 
I hypothesize that the influence of EU membership on national foreign policy is, rather 
than by the quantifiable size (i.e. material resources) of member states, primarily determined 
by the qualitative role of a smaller member state in the development of EU foreign policy. As 
Neill Nugent argues, ‘a small state in resource terms may not necessarily be so in influence 
and power terms. Careful and astute use of diplomatic, mediating and brokerage skills may 
[…] enhance the international position a state may be expected to occupy […] by virtue of its - 3 - 
 
resources  alone’  (Nugent  2003:  4).  Whether  the  process  of  Europeanization  is  either 
amplifying or enmeshing smaller EU member states’ national foreign policies into a European 
whole will thus be determined by the extent to which a smaller member state influences EU 
foreign policy. Consequently, as opposed to a convergence of national foreign policies, which 
is expected in the literature on Europeanization (Wong 2005), I argue that EU membership 
will rather lead to a mixed pattern of converged and parallel bilateral relations.  
I will proceed as follows. A first part conceptualizes EU foreign policy in terms of issue 
areas.  The  second  part  examines  the  development  of  EU  foreign  policy  towards  the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). With a detailed analysis of the policy process, I 
aim at distinguishing the determining dynamics within each issue area of EU policies and the 
role Belgium, as one of the smaller EU member state, plays in those areas. A last section 
considers the determinants of a smaller member state’s influence in EU foreign policy. This 
section also looks into the ways the role of a member state in EU foreign policy affects the 
dominant dimension and consequences of the process of Europeanization on bilateral policies.  
 
Conceptualizing EU foreign policy 
The EU’s ‘external relation system’ entails a combination of ‘three strands’: (1) the 
European  Communities’  external  relations,  (2)  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy 
(CFSP)  and  the  European  Security  and  Defense  Policy  (ESDP),  and  (3)  national  foreign 
policies (Hill 1993: 322). EU foreign policy, which is composed of the first two strands, 
meets the classic features of a regime: it is characterized by a set of distinct principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures (Krasner 1982: 2, Smith M. E. 2004: 117-144), and is 
supported by institutional arrangements that extended over time (Young 1986: 111-115, Allen 
1998: 54-55). Furthermore, EU foreign policy entails various issue-areas (Hill 1993: 322). 
Defined as a regime, EU foreign policy has two significations: first, it represents a sub-system 
of  international  relations  that  entails  a  set  of  international  institutions  coordinating  the 
interests  and  preferences  of  its  members  (internal  dimension).  Second,  it  generates 
international relations, representing a power that has an impact on the international arena 
(external dimension) (Hill and Smith 2005: 4-9).  
The  idea  of  ‘issue-areas’  is  of  particular  relevance  when  analyzing  the  internal  and 
external impact of EU foreign policy. An issue area is a set of issues which policy-makers 
consider closely interdependent and which are dealt with collectively. The exact boundaries of - 4 - 
 
issue-areas are difficult to define. Not only are these boundaries defined subjectively, they can 
also  change  over  time  (Keohane  and  Nye  1977:  65).  Even  though  issue-areas  can  be 
approached from different perspectives, the most common approach is content-based (Brecher 
et. al. 1969: 87-88). Within the EU’s foreign policy regime, Christopher Hill suggests that 
there  are  three  such  areas:  political,  military  and  economic  (Hill  1993:  322).  This 
classification  largely  corresponds  to  the  Common  Foreign  Security  Policy  (CFSP),  the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and ‘Community’-issues respectively.  
Within  each  issue-area,  the  actors,  motives’  intensity  and  direction  as  well  as  the 
interaction sequences vary. Moreover, the pattern of institutional organization, and thus the 
explanatory variables of policy outcomes, depend on the issue at stake (Rosenau 1967: 12). 
This is echoed by EU-scholars who argue that it is ultimately the policy issue which reveals 
the features of the policy processes in the EU: ‘much EU policy-making and decision-making 
…  tends  to  be  rather  compartmentalized  and  it  is  within,  rather  than  across  policy-
compartments  that  the  trading,  bargaining,  linkaging  and  compromising  that  are  so 
characteristic of EU processes are mainly to be found’ (Nugent 2003: 357). Helen Wallace 
concludes similarly: ‘policy processes are potentially very variable from one issue-area to 
another’ (Wallace H. 1996, 27). In order to analyze the institutional organization within an 
issue-area, the authority structures out of which policies emanate need to be defined. Instead 
of attempting to rank these structures in a hierarchical order of importance (government), it is 
of importance to look at the role played by all those who have the authority to initiate and 
sustain actions within a given issue-area (governance) (Rosenau 1990: 40-41).  
The specific patterns of organization of authority within a given issue-area is covered by 
the idea of a system, entailing the structured political action connected with a particular policy 
issue.  There  exists  no  single  system,  but  rather  a  separate  system  for  each  issue.  The 
underlying assumption is twofold: first, there is no over-arching issue encompassing all issues 
within the EU’s foreign policy regime. Second, there is neither a single group of actors nor a 
single  resource  of  power  that  are  strong  enough  to  dominate  in  all  issue  areas.  Different 
actors, resources and motives will be relevant depending on the issue at stake (Willetts 1990: 
269).  Sarah  Collinson  labels  this  an  issue-system:  ‘a  set  of  actors,  political  structures 
(including institutions) and the political action or interaction (processes) within a particular 
issue-area’. The boundaries of these issue-systems coincide with the boundaries of the issue-
area (Collinson 1999: 213).  - 5 - 
 
Nevertheless, issue areas are not completely separated from one another. Horizontal or 
‘inter-systematic’ linkages connect the different issue systems within the regime. They can for 
instance be found between civilian operations and development aid, or between trade policies 
and human rights (Collinson 1999: 214-215). Horizontal linkages are likely to emerge when 
issues appear on the agenda of different systems or subsystems. Given that different issues 
will generate the involvement of different (combination of) actors and interests, such linkages 
will not merge various issue-systems but rather result in highly complex sets of relations. In 
order to understand the relation between the EU’s foreign policy regime and member states’ 
national foreign policies, analyses should thus not only be concerned with the examination of 
the different issue-systems but also with the analysis of the linkages between the relevant 
issue-systems. 
 
The development of EU foreign policy to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
EU foreign policy towards the DRC is characterized by a remarkable evolution. Initial 
relations date back from the late 1950s and were incorporated in the ACP framework
3. It is 
only in the 1990s, however, that the relations between the EU and the DRC matured. Political 
considerations (European Commission 1995, 1996, 1997) were more explicitly pronounced in 
the  EU’s  policies  (Møller  2001:  31)  and  member  states  appointed  an  EU  Special 
Representative (EUSR) to the Great Lakes region, increasing the EU’s political visibility. The 
Congolese peace process (2002-2006) allowed the EU to strengthen its political role in the 
DRC with the deployment of two civilian and two military operations. The civilian missions 
(EUPOL and EUSEC) aim at strengthening the institutional structures of the DRC in the 
security sector. The military missions (ARTEMIS and EUFOR RDC), which were both short 
in time and geographically limited, assisted the UN’s MONUC in securing the Congolese 
peace process (Hoebeke, et. al. 2007: 8-11). Today, the EU is one of the key political and 
strategic partners to the incumbent Congolese regime. This makes the DRC probably one of 
the best examples of the interface between first and second pillar policies, drawing various 
EU actors in the development and conduct of its policies. The EU’s strong actorness in the 
DRC  creates  a  window  of  opportunity  that  has  offered  new  chances  and  constraints  to 
member states as well as EU actors.  
                                                           
3 The ACP framework comprises a group of countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The framework 
covers three policy areas: political relations, development and humanitarian aid, and trade cooperation. - 6 - 
 
Within  the  EU’s  policies  towards  the  DRC,  four  issue-areas  which  policy-makers 
consider  closely  interdependent  can  be  identified:  (1)  political  relations,  (2)  trade, 
development and humanitarian aid, (3) civilian missions, and (4) military operations. The 
dynamics  characterizing each of these areas and more in particular  Belgium’s role in the 
development of EU policies will be examined below. 
Political relations 
Member states have the biggest stake in the development of the EU’s political stance 
towards the DRC. Member states dispose of several channels through which they can exert 
influence:  the  COREU  network
4,  the  Africa  Working  Party  (COAFR),  the  Political  and 
Security Committee (PSC) and the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). 
The first venue to influence debates is COAFR in which the political relations of the EU with 
Africa are discussed, and in which conclusions and common positions are drafted. In addition 
to the weekly meetings of COAFR, the Africa directors of all EU Foreign Ministries meet 
once a month in Brussels. Even if member states deal with Africa as a whole within COAFR, 
the DRC is one of the most recurrent themes on the agenda and often takes most of the time 
due to its complexity. Even if all member states have the opportunity to engage in discussions, 
participants in COAFR, but also in the PSC, confirm that in the actual discussions on the 
DRC only a handful of member states
5 are actively involved. Within this active ‘core’, the 
position of member states is more determined by the extent of their knowledge, expertise and 
involvement in the region than by the material resources they dispose of. Representatives 
from both small and big member states do not perceive the ‘quantitative’ size of member 
states within this group of active states as the determining factor defining one’s position. 
Smaller  member  states  within  this  group  find  themselves  in  a  similar position  as  the  big 
member states (interviews, Brussels).  
Furthermore, the EU Special Representative plays a central role in the development of 
the EU’s political relations with the DRC, internally between the different EU actors and 
member  states  as  well  as  externally  between  the  EU  and  the  Congolese  (and  regional) 
authorities. Internally, the EUSR plays a prominent role in both COAFR and the PSC. In 
these bodies, the EUSR, a post currently held by the Dutchman Roeland Van de Geer, briefs 
member states on his latest contacts and shares his analyses. His role is highly valued by 
                                                           
4 The COREU network is an EU communication network between the Member States, the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat. It allows for a swift exchange of information and analyses on topics in the field of foreign 
policy. 
5 The most recurrent member states cited are Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom. - 7 - 
 
member  states  as  the  majority  lacks  expertise  and  diplomatic  resources  in  the  region. 
Moreover,  the  EUSR  is  seen  as  a  neutral  actor,  providing  ‘EU-made’  information  that  is 
gathered on a high political level in the region. This puts the EUSR in a position where he can 
shape and frame the debates on the DRC, setting the agenda and guiding member states in the 
elaboration of their common positions. Besides his active role in debates, initiatives such as a 
Great Lakes strategy (in preparation) allow the EUSR to play an important role in preparing 
and steering the EU’s political relations with the DRC. Especially, for smaller member states, 
the relation with the EUSR is of crucial importance. He allows smaller member states to 
transcend their national roles, in Brussels as well as in the region. As one participant of a 
smaller member state notes, it is of utmost importance for a smaller member state to be on the 
same line as the EUSR, either to move him to their position or to align themselves with him. 
Otherwise their role in the discussions is severely curtailed (interviews, Brussels).    
The  European  Commission  is  also  a  strong  political  player  in  EU-DRC  relations. 
Through an active participation in debates and the drafting of policy documents (e.g. Africa 
Strategy), the Commission became closely involved in the development of the EU’s political 
profile in Africa (Krause 2003: 236-237). In discussions on the DRC, the Commission has 
several assets that has strengthened its role considerably over the years. The Commission’s 
long-standing engagement in the region (over 50 years) is supplemented with an extensive 
network  of  Delegations  on  the  ground  and  significant  financial  resources.  Moreover,  the 
personal commitment of the responsible Commissioner for Development, Mr. Louis Michel, 
further enhances the political profile of the Commission in DRC discussions. Especially on 
the higher political levels in the PSC and the GAERC, the Commission is a leader in the 
political discussions on the DRC. While the EUSR has to balance member states positions 
carefully, the Commission has a much more independent role. This makes it difficult for 
member states, and in particular the smaller ones, to weigh on the Commission’s positions 
(interviews, Brussels).   
In this context, the main objective of Belgian policy-makers is to create a context which 
fosters consensus among member states and thus facilitates the issuing of EU positions. This 
is a very incremental and collective process, and thus difficult to measure. Nevertheless, the 
impact of this process is clear in the case of the DRC. At the time of the EUSR’s appointment 
in  1996,  the  UK  and  France  had  diametrically  opposed  ideas  on  how  to  deal  with  the 
incumbent  regimes  in  the  region.  Under  the  impulse  of  intense  information-sharing  and 
coordination, member states gradually moved towards a common position, resulting in an 
increasingly shared understanding of the problems in the region. Belgian diplomats actively - 8 - 
 
contribute to this process, sharing their first-hand information, analyses and expertise with 
other  member  states.  Several  participants  in  these  committees  indicate  the  active  and 
informative stance of Belgian officials when issues concerning the DRC pop up in discussions 
(interviews,  Brussels).  These  internal  efforts  are  further  complemented  with  external 
activities. In the DRC, Belgium is for instance involved in the Contact Group Great Lakes
6 in 
which its members analyze the situation and share information, coordinating the position of 
the international actors in the region. Such small informal groups do not take any formal 
decisions, but they prepare the elaboration of proposals and decisions for other forums such as 
the UN. For Belgium, the participation in such an informal group offers an opportunity to 
reinforce its position in the EU, either directly by strengthening its credibility or indirectly via 
EU actors and other key European (or international) partners (interviews, Brussels). 
Trade policies, development cooperation and humanitarian aid 
Regarding  trade  policies,  development  cooperation  and  humanitarian  aid,  the 
Commission  is  the  central  actor  in  the  policy  process.  It  initiates  policies  and  plays  a 
dominant role in the implementation phase. Within the Commission, DG Development is the 
chief directorate, with DG Trade responsible for negotiating the trade component of the ACP 
framework. In contrast to other foreign policy areas, DG RELEX is largely excluded. In their 
relations towards the DRC, DG Development puts most emphasis on poverty reduction, while 
DG Trade is more focused on integrating the ACP countries in the world economy (Dickson 
2004: 50). There is nonetheless a strong effort from both DG’s to integrate their efforts. In the 
negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA’s) for example, a package that 
mainly covers the trade aspects of the Cotonou framework, the negotiation phase is covered 
by  both  DG’s  (Maerten  and  Tison  2009).  Also  the  Commission  Delegation  in  Kinshasa 
reinforces the Commission’s role. Being the ‘ears and mouth’ of the Commission on the 
ground, the Delegation is essential for the Commission’s leverage and position in the policy 
process (interviews, Brussels).  
Member states ultimately decide on the development and trade relations with the DRC. 
Within  the  range  of  DG  Development’s  activities,  a  difference  has  to  be  made  between 
development aid and humanitarian assistance. Due to its purpose, the latter – which accounts 
for more than 30% of the budget of DG Development for the DRC – is often rushed through 
the decision-making process. This gives the Commission more freedom to direct funds. But as 
                                                           
6 The Contact Group Great Lakes comprises Belgium, the EU, France, The Netherlands, United Nations, United 
Kingdom and United States. - 9 - 
 
far  as  development  cooperation  is  concerned,  member  states  keep  a  stronger  hold  on  the 
Commission. Formally speaking, member states take decisions in the European Development 
Fund (EDF
7) committee. In practice, however, it is very difficult for member states to alter the 
general objectives and orientations submitted by the Commission as these reflect a delicate 
balance  of  various  interests  (member  states,  European  Parliament  and  international  actors 
such  as  the  OECD,  UN  and  World  Bank).  Instead,  member  states  try  to  weigh  on  the 
Commission’s  preparations  as  well  as  at  the  stage  of  implementation.  According  to 
Commission  officials,  big  and  small  member  states  are  both  very  active  in  this  regard. 
Sweden and The Netherlands, for example, plead strongly to address the cause of sexual 
violence in the EU development policies towards the DRC while Belgium lobbied for instance 
for (indirect) Commission assistance to the EU’s civilian missions.  In  the latter  case, the 
Commission attributed €3.2 million in support of the newly integrated brigades (EUSEC) 
under the Instrument for Stability (interview, Brussels). Member states with a strong national 
profile in the DRC remain in close contact with DG Development as well as the Delegation in 
Kinshasa. Especially during the phase of elaboration and implementation, EU member states 
can  have  a  stake  in  the  prioritization  of  EU  development  policies.  At  this  stage,  the 
Commission  Delegation  in  Kinshasa  drafts  the  first  proposals  (strategy  and  allocation  of 
funds).  In  the  implementation  stage,  member  states  primarily  target  the  Commission 
Delegation in Kinshasa who holds a key position. Clearly, this requires a substantive presence 
of experts on the ground who remain in close contact with local Commission officials (e.g. 
sectorial  coordination meetings). More than trying to direct the spending priorities of the 
Commission,  member  states  aim  at  coordinating  and  streamlining  their  national  and  the 
European  projects  in  order  to  raise  the  effectiveness  of  their  own  policies  (interviews, 
Brussels).  
Civilian missions 
The elaboration, implementation and follow-up of the civilian missions is dominated by 
the  Council  Secretariat  who  can  be  considered  as  a  true  policy  entrepreneur.  From  2003 
onwards, the Africa desk of the High Representative’s Policy Unit and the EUSR explored the 
possibilities to integrate the EU’s civilian instruments in its policies towards the DRC. After 
recurrent reporting of the EUSR on this possibility, the High Representative sent a mission 
headed by officials from his Policy Unit to undertake an in-depth assessment to be presented 
                                                           
7  The  European  Development  Fund  (EDF)  is  the  main  financial  instrument  providing  Community  aid  for 
development cooperation  with the countries of  Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries). It is 
financed outside the Community budget. - 10 - 
 
to the PSC. Even if a civilian dimension to EU policies towards the DRC were at that point at 
least  debatable,  the  High  Representative  managed,  with  the  support  of  only  a  handful  of 
member states, to gather a critical mass to approve the launch of two very limited missions 
(interviews, Brussels). Another example are the activities of the Council Secretariat to extend 
the scope of EUPOL and EUSEC. Especially EUPOL is characterized by what can be called 
‘mission creep’, moving beyond its original goals. EUPOL was initially launched to assist the 
Congolese  authorities  on  a  technical  level  during  the  transition  period  in  Kinshasa.  Even 
though the transition period ended in 2006, the mission still exists and has been extended to 
the whole country. Moreover, member states currently discuss the Council Secretariat’s idea 
to include a ‘project cell’ in EUPOL, further broadening the scope of the mission to include 
various  activities  such  as  transport  and  education.  These  debates  were  and  are  primarily 
steered by the Council Secretariat (interviews, Brussels).  
The European Commission was pushed in to engage in the civilian operations through 
the  so-called  ‘flanking  measures’.  These  measures  entail  humanitarian  assistance, 
strengthening the appeal for some of the more critical member states to support the civilian 
missions.  A  second  element  that  engages  the  Commission  is  the  financing  of  civilian 
missions.  Depending  on  the  aspect,  civilian  missions  fall  either  under  the  appropriate 
Community  budget  line  or  under  the  CFSP  budget  line  of  the  Community  budget. 
Consequently,  the  Heads  of  Mission  of  EUPOL  and  EUSEC  have  to  report  to  and  are 
supervised  by  the  Commission  (Council  2007).  The  ‘power  of  the  purse’  gives  the 
Commission  the  leverage  to  influence  the  content  of  the  civilian  missions  (interviews, 
Brussels). 
Even though member states ultimately decide on the adoption of civilian missions, they 
play a less visible role in its elaboration. This, however, does not imply that member states are 
completely  absent  in  the  preparatory  stages.  On  the  contrary,  member  states  have  two 
concrete  ways  through  which  they  exert  influence.  First,  via  the  Council  Secretariat  (and 
partially  the  Commission),  member  states  can  keep  closely  in  contact  with  those  people 
directly involved in the preparation and follow-up of the different missions. Especially the 
traditional strategy of seconding national officials – to bodies such as the Africa Desk and the 
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) – gives member states privileged points of 
access in the preparatory  process. Second, active involvement on the ground in the DRC 
allows member states to strengthen their position in Brussels. It gives them the opportunity to 
get first-hand information and gain a deeper insight of the situation. Moreover, the weekly EU 
coordination meetings in Kinshasa offer member states a chance to share their information, - 11 - 
 
expertise and points of view with one another and with those EU actors who are influential in 
the debates in Brussels (e.g. the Heads of Mission and the EUSR). Those member states that 
are active in the policy process in Brussels are also those with a strong national presence in 
the DRC. The flow of information between member states and the EU actors on the ground is 
of particular importance, forming the basis of smaller member states’ influence (interviews, 
Brussels).  
Belgian  policy-makers  actively  contributed  to  the  preparation  and  elaboration  of  the 
initial plans for civilian missions. Based on national civilian and military programs that were 
running since 2003 in the DRC, Belgium shared its experiences with the officials responsible 
in the Council Secretariat. Also the secondment of key figures in the Africa desk of Mr. 
Solana facilitates the access for Belgian policymakers to the Secretariat. In early 2007, the 
Council Secretariat was working on an initiative in which it wanted to propose to merge the 
EUSEC  and  EUPOL  missions.  Most  member  states  did  not  oppose  the  idea,  hoping  to 
alleviate the financial and logistical burden to the EU. Belgium, however, strongly opposed 
the  idea.  Belgian  policymakers  argued  that,  at  a  time  when  the  institutional  structures 
concerning these missions were not yet fully fledged, integrating both missions would risk 
jeopardizing the efficiency achieved on the ground. In the end, the Council Secretariat did not 
issue any formal proposal, but maintained the current character of the missions (interview, 
Brussels). Regarding the activities of EUSEC, Belgium continues to strengthen its bilateral 
profile. Ahead of an EU mission in early 2009, Belgium sent a national mission to evaluate its 
own efforts in the area of military integration in the DRC. With this proactive stance, Belgium 
aims  at  strengthening  its  position  in  the  forthcoming  discussions  in  the  EU  (interview, 
Brussels).  
Military operations 
The EU military operations in the DRC are a matter of the dominant member states of 
the EU. The decision to intervene militarily in the DRC was twice made by the ‘big three’: 
France, the United Kingdom and Germany. The role of the smaller member states and the 
Council  Secretariat  was  reduced  to  a  mere  supporting  role,  while  the  Commission  was 
completely  excluded  (interviews,  Brussels).  This  was  most  strongly  illustrated  with  the 
ARTEMIS operation in 2003. Well before the EU got involved in the preparations, French 
preparations were already well under way. As a result, the operation is rather seen as a French 
operation under EU flag than an EU operation led by the French (Hoebeke et. al. 2007: 8).  - 12 - 
 
Although  Belgium  often  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  development  of  EU  policies 
towards  the  DRC,  it  occupied  a  secondary  role  in  the  policy  processes  preceding  both 
interventions. However, from the moment the dominant states, notably France and the UK, 
favored  a  mission,  Belgian  policymakers  contributed  actively,  both  politically  and 
diplomatically, to gather support among EU member states. One participant acknowledges 
that a country like Belgium cannot do much as long as there is no window of opportunity 
created by the big member states (interview, Brussels). This was confirmed in late 2008 when 
violence broke out in the East of Congo. While Belgium, among other smaller states, pleaded 
strongly and openly for an EU mission, and managed to put the issue twice on the agenda of 
the GAERC and once on the agenda of the European Council, notably the UK and Germany 
blocked any suggestion that would lead to an EU intervention in the DRC (Kubosova 2008). 
Eventually, member states did not agree to reinforce MONUC, let alone to launch an EU 
mission. 
 
Small State Power and the Process of Europeanization  
Small State Power in EU Foreign Policy 
A smaller member states’ capacity to influence the development of EU foreign policy is 
primarily dependent on the issue-area under consideration. Even though the same actors are 
involved in most areas, they do so in varying degree and with differing interests. This has 
consequences for all actors involved, but especially for smaller member states. Concretely, the 
case study demonstrates that a smaller EU member state can play a significant role in the 
development of the EU’s political relations with third countries as well as in the EU’s civilian 
missions  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  development  policies.  Concerning  military  operations, 
however, a smaller member state is dependent on the role of the dominant member states. If 
the latter create a window of opportunity, a small member state can still play a secondary role 
in the elaboration and implementation of an intervention. Overall, four factors are identified 
which determine the extent to which a smaller member state can influence EU foreign policy.  
(1) The logic of arguing. When the policy process in a given issue area is characterized 
by the logic of arguing, the possibilities for a smaller member state to influence EU foreign 
policy increases significantly. The logic of arguing refers to a situation in which participants 
are open to being persuaded by the ‘better argument’ and in which relations of power, force 
and  coercion  recede  in  the  background.  Instead  of  changing  one’s  preferences,  the  main - 13 - 
 
objective is to find the ground for a reasoned consensus about a policy issue. A policy process 
is  only  likely  to  be  characterized  by  a  logic  of  arguing  under  a  restricted  set  of  three 
conditions: (a) a high degree of institutionalization, (b) uncertainty of interests and/or lack of 
knowledge about the situation among actors, and (c) nonhierarchical relations enabling dense 
interactions in network-like settings. In other words, the degree to which the logic of arguing 
will prevail varies considerably according to issue-areas (Risse 2000: 7-21).  
The policy context in which the EU develops its political relations, civilian missions 
and, to a lesser extent, development policies, to the DRC is characterized by such a logic of 
arguing.  In  these  policy  areas,  processes  of  argumentation,  deliberation  and  persuasion 
constitute the distinct mode of social interaction determining policy outcomes. All three areas 
are characterized by a high degree of institutionalization, with both the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat playing a central role. This brings big and small member states on a more 
equal footing (Grieco 1996: 289). Furthermore, debates on the DRC are characterized by a 
low degree of interest by most member states, with only a handful of member states being 
actively involved. The policy process leading to the military missions, on the other hand, lack 
these  characteristics.  The  prevailing  relations  are  strictly  hierarchical,  with  the  big  three 
member  states  taking  the  lead  on  all  fronts.  The  reason  why  such  a  logic  is  impeded  to 
develop is mostly related to the interests of big and small member states which are structurally 
different. According to Michael Smith, the three ‘core’ EU members (i.e. France, Germany 
and United Kingdom) need to be separated from the others. The former do not only make a 
calculation  of  national  versus  European  interests  but  also  of  European  against  wider 
considerations  (especially  strategic  considerations,  the  development  of  EU  military 
capabilities and the integration process at large) (Smith 2003: 567-568). Catherine Gegout 
echoes this point of view, arguing that EU decisions to intervene militarily in Africa stem 
from  an  agreement  among  the  big  three  whose  reasons  originate  from  their  strategic 
calculations rather than from a reaction to a crisis situation (Gegout 2005: 439-443). As a 
result, smaller member states are deprived of the means to substantially influence the EU’s 
military operations.      
(2) The role of information. The extent to which a smaller member state disposes of 
first-hand information, analyses and expertise determines its influence in the EU’s foreign 
policy-making machinery. Information can alter the perceptions and understanding of policy 
issues, generating trust and producing common views on specific foreign policy issues (Smith 
M. E. 2004, 92). The resulting process of learning can alter the role conceptions of member 
states which serve as mental maps for political action, changing the way how member states - 14 - 
 
deal  with  a  particular  issue  or  problem  (Aggestam  2004:  81-91).  Those  disposing  of 
information in a context where others do not to a similar extent are thus in a strong position to 
influence  policy  outcomes.  Consequently,  a  smaller  member  states  with  limited  material 
resources in the field of foreign and security policy will be compensated.  
In the development of EU policies to the DRC, it is demonstrated that Belgium, as a 
smaller member state, bases its influence on the extent to which it shares information and 
analyses,  framed  by  a  solid  reputation  vis-à-vis  other  member  states  built  on  thorough 
expertise, long-standing engagement in the region, openness and transparency in its agenda 
and in its objectives pursued (interviews, Brussels). The concrete impact of information plays 
at  all  stages  of  the  policy  process:  in  the  agenda-setting,  the  elaboration  of  policies,  the 
(informal)  decision-making  process  as  well  as  in  the  implementation  phase.  Most 
prominently, these assets make a difference in the political, development and civilian issue-
areas. As illustrated, a constant flow of information on the DRC within and outside the EU 
fosters a context in which common analyses are more likely to be made. This is, in turn, a 
prerequisite to come to common action (Cooper 2007). Concrete examples are the elaboration 
and follow-up of the civilian mission, the recurrent reporting on the political situation on the 
ground as well as the diverting of EU development funds in support of the Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) activities. In contrast, in the development of military operations the role of 
information is limited, downplaying the ability of a smaller member state to play a role in EU 
foreign policy.  
 (3) Involvement in the region. The extent of involvement of a smaller member state in a 
third  country  is  closely  related  to  its  ability  to  influence  EU  foreign  policy  towards  that 
country. When a member state is highly involved in a third country, it will strengthen its 
credibility and reputation in the EU. This is of course also related to the role of information: 
when a smaller member state is able to optimize the flow of information among its partners, it 
will increase its credibility, and hence be allowed to punch above its weight. 
In the case of the DRC, those member states that are particularly active in the region are 
also those member states that have most weight in discussions in Brussels. The three issue-
areas of EU foreign policy in which Belgium is most influential are also those areas in which 
it has a strong involvement in the region. Belgian political relations with the DRC are very 
elaborate. It disposes of the biggest foreign mission in the DRC (embassy and consulates), its 
ministers frequently visit the country, Belgian diplomats play a prominent role in the regional 
contact groups and the Belgian foreign minister has his own personal envoy for the region, - 15 - 
 
complementing  traditional  diplomatic  staff.  Regarding  the  civilian  missions,  Belgium  has 
extensive bilateral civilian and military programs with the DRC since 2003. These programs 
are set up to complement the EU’s EUPOL and EUSEC missions. Yet, in practice, Belgian 
policymakers  aim  at  setting  the  pace  of  the  EU  missions  by  advancing  these  national 
programs. Also Belgian bilateral development policies dispose of substantial resources. Its 
funds  amount  to  €  150  million  a  year,  a  sum  surpassing  the  Commission’s  financial 
instruments (€ 130 million in 2009) and those of other EU countries such as The Netherlands 
(€63 million in 2009) and the United Kingdom (£75 million in 2009). In contrast, Belgium’s 
ability to get involved in military interventions with active combat troops is very limited. 
After the killing of 10 Belgian soldiers in Rwanda in 1994, the Belgian parliament voted a 
resolution that prohibits Belgium of sending active combat troops to former colonies. As a 
result,  Belgian  policymakers  are  constrained  in  their  ability  to  take  the  lead  in  this  area, 
reducing  their  ability  to  influence  the  EU’s  military  interventions.  Even  though  Belgian 
policymakers can still try to put an issue on the agenda (e.g. November – December 2008), 
they lack the actual capabilities to contribute to EU policies. This decreases the credibility of 
Belgian effort in this field, curtailing the potential to influence the EU’s military operations.  
(4) The role of EU actors. The extent of influence of a smaller member state depends on 
te extent of the involvement of EU actors in the policy process. EU actors are crucial partners 
to a smaller member state, inside as well as outside of Brussels. The relevant EU actors are 
primarily the Council Secretariat and the Commission. In Brussels, these actors are seen as 
neutral in the sense that their role goes beyond mere national interests and objectives. If a 
member state manages to align its position with that of EU actors, they can transcend a strict 
national role. Outside of Brussels, the informal and small scale forums in which member 
states and EU actors meet allow to develop a mutual understanding and trust. In such smaller, 
informal settings outside of Brussels, (smaller) member states have more opportunities to 
influence  the  position  of  EU  actors.  This  gives  smaller  member  states  an  opportunity  to 
indirectly influence the policy process in Brussels.  
In the EU’s political relations to the DRC, the role of the EUSR is of crucial importance 
to a smaller member state. The EUSR sets the agenda, has the ability to steer and frame 
debates and plays an important role in the implementation of policies. A case in point is the 
preparation by the EUSR of a Great Lake strategy as well as his numerous presentations to the 
PSC.  Regarding  the  civilian  missions,  the  Africa  desk  and  the  CPCC  in  the  Council 
Secretariat are important points of access to a smaller member state. These bodies are directly 
responsible for the elaboration of and follow-up to civilian missions. When a smaller member - 16 - 
 
state maintains open and frequent contacts with these organs, it can effectively influence the 
EU’s civilian missions. In the case of  development policies, the situation is dissimilar. Here, 
the  relation  with  the  Commission,  and  more  in  particular  DG  Development  and  the 
Commission Delegation in Kinshasa, stands central. Its resources allow the Commission to be 
less dependent on member states’ positions, making the potential for member states to direct 
spending  in  particular  countries  more  difficult.  Nevertheless,  through  the  Commission’s 
Delegations, who have  a substantial stake in the direction and prioritization of EU funds 
(interview, Brussels), the member states have an additional, indirect way of influencing the 
spending  priorities  of  the  Commission  (interview,  Brussels).  Lastly,  regarding  military 
operations, the absence of EU actors deprive smaller member states of potential means to 
strengthen their position. 
 
Europeanizing bilateral diplomacy?  
The central proposition of Europeanization is that EU membership has an important 
impact  on  member  states’  foreign  policies  and  that  this  impact  is  increasing  in  salience. 
According  to  Wong,  this  may  result  in  a  convergence  of  policies  or  an  amplification  of 
national foreign policies (Wong 2005: 150). Several studies conclude that the elaboration and 
implementation of a smaller member state’s foreign policy changes substantially as a direct 
result  of  the  process  of  Europeanization  (Manners  and  Whitman  2000,  Tonra  2001, 
Torreblanca  2001).  Although  the  process  of  Europeanization  is  widely  considered  as 
beneficial  for  the  conduct  of  smaller  EU  states’  foreign  policies,  this  impact  is  not 
straightforward. Policymakers of smaller member states see the process of Europeanization as 
constraining, while at the same hand strengthening their national foreign policies. But overall, 
the process of Europeanization of smaller member states’ foreign policies is considered as one 
that enhances rather than reduces their ability to impact upon the international environment 
(Tonra  2001:  280).  The  way  in  which  member  states  can  impact  on  the  international 
environment  may,  however,  differ  significantly.  Manners  and  Whitman  conclude  in  their 
study that the impact of EU membership on smaller member states’ foreign policies primarily 
depends  on  their  orientation,  whether  the  EU  is  the  central  forum  through  which  foreign 
policy objectives are pursued or just one among many (Manners and Whitman 2000: 263-
264). Despite these conclusions, the conditions which determine the impact of the process of 
Europeanization on smaller member states’ bilateral relations with third countries remains 
rather broadly defined.  - 17 - 
 
Rather than its general foreign policy orientation, this case-study finds that the impact 
on a smaller member state’s foreign policy is closely related to the role this state plays in the 
development of EU foreign policy. This role varies greatly depending on the issue-area. In 
policy areas where a smaller member state plays a determining role, and thus maximizes the 
projection of its national preferences on the EU-level, EU membership amplifies national 
foreign policymaking. In defining the political relations of the EU with the DRC, the aligning 
of EU positions with Belgian political objectives strengthens the Belgian bilateral position in 
the DRC. A former Belgian ambassador to the DRC acknowledges that it makes a significant 
difference when one is able to refer to the position of the EU in its bilateral contacts with his 
Congolese  counterparts.  This  substantially  increases  the  political  leverage  of  a  smaller 
member state. Especially for certain politically sensitive issues, the fact that a smaller country 
is also an EU member state greatly strengthens its bilateral position (interviews, Brussels). 
Also regarding civilian operations, the bilateral agreement that Belgium has with the DRC 
would lose in political significance if it would not operate in close coordination with the EU. 
While these bilateral programs also serve as instruments to incite and influence EU action in 
this area, the fact that these missions do not operate in a vacuum (i.e. a situation in which the 
EU would be absent) allows Belgium to give more political weight to its bilateral civilian 
activities. Concerning development policies, the national profile remains largely intact. Yet, 
the  frequent  meetings  among  EU  member  states  in  the  DRC  on  aspects  of  development 
cooperation allow member states to avoid duplication and increase coordination, increasing 
the effectiveness of their national policies. Those member states that have strong national 
development policies (strong presence, large funds) are also those who have most leverage in 
the coordination meetings and in the elaboration of EU policies (interviews, Brussels). Even 
though the bilateral relations operate within an EU context, smaller member states that are 
influential players within the EU use EU membership to amplify their bilateral diplomacies 
with third countries. EU membership thus allows smaller member states’ bilateral diplomacies 
to become less rather than more vulnerable.  
Conversely, when a smaller member state plays no (or a less) significant role in the 
development of EU foreign policy, pressures to converge into a European whole are high. 
Even if national objectives can still be pursued (more passively), the national profile of a 
member state decreases, enmeshing its foreign policy into a wider European whole. In this 
case, the downloading of EU-generated incentives will be the dominant dimension of the 
process of Europeanization. This pressure to converge national foreign policies will likely 
result  in  a  gradual  removal  of  national  foreign  policymaking  from  national  capitals  to - 18 - 
 
Brussels. This process of Brusselization does not mean that member states communitarize 
their foreign policies but rather that they rely primarily on ‘Brussels’ to act on foreign policy 
issues (Allen 1998: 54-55). Military operations are an obvious example. In the development 
of EU military operations, the smaller EU member states lack a strong national profile (e.g. 
capabilities,  expertise,  involvement)  which  deprives  them  of  the  possibilities  to  play  an 
influential role in the policy process. Smaller member states are forced to follow the dominant 
member  states.  As  a  result,  they  come  under  pressure  to  enmesh  their  national  foreign 
policymaking in a wider European effort. In these instances, the Europeanization of foreign 
policy towards third countries should be understood as a subsumption of bilateral relations. 
This constraint does not necessarily imply a weakening of a smaller member state’s foreign 
policy. As smaller member states often lack bilateral capacities to develop national initiatives 
anyways,  the  possibility  to  move  those  aspects  to  the  EU-level  may  still  result  in  a 
strengthening of their national foreign policy action.  
Either way, EU membership strengthens a smaller member state’s foreign policy with 
third countries. When a smaller member state plays an influential role in EU foreign policy, 
the resources of the dominant member states are devoted towards an issue of importance to a 
smaller member state, strengthening its national capacities. In this case, the Europeanization 
of  foreign  policy  results  in  a  pattern  of  parallel  national  and  European  policies.  When  a 
smaller member state is not influential in the formation of EU foreign policy, and is pressured 
to  converge  its  national  policies  to  EU  policies,  it  may  still  strengthen  its  position 
internationally. Being able to participate, even passively, in a European effort still constitutes 
a  reinforcement  of  its  national  policy.  Consequently,  a  varying  pattern  of  converged  and 
parallel diplomacies of national and European policies will emerge.     
 
Conclusion 
This paper’s aim was to examine the impact of EU membership on a smaller member 
state’s national foreign policy. On the basis of the concept of issue areas, the paper analyzed 
the development of EU foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The 
paper focused in particular on the role of Belgium as one of the EU’s smaller member states. 
Subsequently, the paper examined the conditions under which a smaller member state can be 
influential in the development of EU foreign policy. Then the paper looked at how the role of 
a  small  member  state  in  EU  foreign  policy  affects  the  impact  of  the  process  of 
Europeanization on its bilateral relation with countries outside the EU.  - 19 - 
 
This  paper  identified  four  factors  that  determine  the  extent  to  which  a  smaller  EU 
member state can play an influential role in the development of EU foreign policy. First, when 
a policy process in a given issue area of EU foreign policy is characterized by the ‘logic of 
arguing’, a smaller state’s influence may increase substantially. In such a context, participants 
are  open  to  being  persuaded  by  the  better  argument,  with  relations  of  power,  force  and 
coercion  receding  in  the  background.  Also  the  extent  to  which  a  smaller  member  state 
disposes of first-hand information, analyses and expertise as well as the extent to which it is 
involved in the region determines its role in EU foreign policy. The extent to which EU actors 
are involved in the policy process is a last factor influencing a smaller member state’s role in 
EU foreign policy. EU actors are key allies to smaller member states aiming at influencing 
EU foreign policy. The degree to which these four elements are present in the policy process 
determine the influence of smaller EU member state. 
It is difficult to draw straightforward conclusions about the impact of EU membership 
on smaller member state’s foreign policies. Depending on the role a smaller member state 
plays  in  the  development  of  EU  foreign  policy,  the  consequences  of  the  process  of 
Europeanization varies from an amplification of national policies to a convergence of national 
foreign policies. When the actorness of a smaller member state is high, it increases chances to 
play an influential role in the EU. In this instance, EU membership will amplify national 
foreign policymaking. Conversely, in those policy areas where a smaller member state lacks a 
strong  national  policy,  EU  membership  will  result  increased  pressure  on  smaller  member 
states to converge to EU policies, constraining national room to develop national policies 
outside the EU. Either way, when the EU has a strong actorness towards a third country, this 
strengthens the impact of a smaller member state’s impact on the international environment. 
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